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Yours, Mine and Ours: A Proposal to Bring
Certainty to the Use of Personal Goodwill in
the Sale of Assets of a C Corporation
Teri L.K. Shugart*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal case of Martin Ice Cream1 in 1998, certain
shareholders of closely held2 C corporations3 have had the opportunity to
avoid, in part, double taxation4 on the sale of their corporation’s assets by
allocating some or all of the purchase price to “personal goodwill,” i.e.,
goodwill owned personally by the shareholder rather than by the
corporation. Both the corporation and the shareholder benefit from this
allocation: first, the corporation will be able to report less in proceeds,
which then reduces the amount of taxes it will pay on the sale.5 Second,
the shareholder will have long term capital gains treatment6 on the proceeds
without the proceeds first being subjected to a corporate tax. The buyer has
no dog in this hunt–it will amortize the goodwill over 15 years regardless

* Tax and Business Attorney, San Carlos, Calif., and Adjunct Lecturer at University of Santa
Clara, School of Law
1. Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 189 (1998).
2. “Closely held” does not necessarily mean that the business is small in revenue or net worth. It
only means that there are very few owners. As of 2012, the most recent year for which we have data,
41% of all businesses in the United States had only one owner. www.census.gov/econ/sbo/.
3. Section 1361(a)(2) of the Code defines a “C corporation” as “a corporation which is not an S
corporation.” I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2). In other words, a C corporation is the default setting for
corporations.
4. “Double taxation” is the idea that a corporation is first taxed on the proceeds it receives in a
transaction, and then the shareholders are taxed on the net proceeds they receive from the corporation.
For example, assume a corporation is selling assets for $100,000, which assets have a basis of $30,000.
The net proceeds to the corporation are $70,000. Assuming a corporate tax rate of 35%, the corporation
will pay $24,500 in taxes, and then will distribute out the remainder as a dividend ($45,500) to its
shareholder. Assuming a dividend tax rate of 20%, its shareholder will pay $9,100 in taxes, leaving its
shareholder with a net $36,400. See also Part II.B, infra.
5. In addition, corporations do not receive the benefit of long term capital gains treatment that are
enjoyed by individuals. All proceeds are taxed as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 11.
6. This assumes that the shareholder has owned their stake in this company for at least a year,
which would normally be the case given the criteria for allocating personal goodwill.
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of from whom it was purchased. 7
The problem with allocating proceeds to personal goodwill is that it is
not risk free. Despite case law8 and commentary9 that show a generally
understood list of criteria10 necessary for a seller to take advantage of an
allocation of personal goodwill, its promotion always comes with caveats:
the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) does not like it,11 following
the criteria just reduces the risk of it being respected by the Service,12 and
the criteria aren’t foolproof – they’re just a good defense from a Service
challenge,13 just to name a few. Added to that problem is that the criteria
are not as carved in stone as some of the commentators seem to assert;
rather, these cases are covered in a patina of judges’ feelings about personal
goodwill or the behavior of the litigants.
This article examines in depth the individual cases that came after and
relied on Martin Ice Cream, and then challenges the criteria that others
have determined have been suggested by those cases. Last, this article
suggests a legislative fix (similar to the problem that section 197 was
created to fix)14 to make clear the criteria for allocation of personal
goodwill, which would reduce litigation and give certainty in this area of
law.
II. GOODWILL – BACKGROUND
A. WHAT IS GOODWILL?
To understand personal goodwill, an understanding of goodwill, by
itself, is important. Goodwill is an intangible asset of a business15 that
7. I.R.C. § 197.
8. See Part IV, infra.
9. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property
in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); Bret Wells & Craig Bergez, Disposable
Personal Goodwill, Frosty the Snowman, and Martin Ice Cream All Melt Away in the Bright Sunlight of
Analysis, 91 NEB. L. REV. 170 (2012).
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Risius & Aaron Stumpf, Another Tax Court Case Addresses the Question
of Whether Identified Intangible Value Is Business Goodwill or Personal Goodwill, SRR JOURNAL, last
accessed Sept. 4, 2016, http://www.srr.com/article/another-tax-court-case-addresses-question-whetheridentified-intangible-value-business-goodw.
11. Peter J. Reilly, Personal Goodwill Avoids Corporate Tax Exposure, FORBES, June 13, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2014/06/13/personal-goodwill-avoids-corporate-taxexposure/# 3cb0 de6321b4.
12. Timothy M. Todd, Whose Goodwill Is It? The Taxation of Goodwill in Owner-Entity
Transactions, 122 J. TAX'N 74, 81 (2015).
13. Nick Gruidl, Amy Kasden & Peter Enyart, Personal Goodwill: Alive and Well Indeed!, TAX
ADVISER, March 31, 2015, http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2015/apr/tax-clinic-07.html.
14. Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, A Transactional Guide to New Code Section 197, TAX
NOTES, Oct. 25, 1993, at 474. See Part III, infra.
15. An intangible asset is a non-physical asset that has value. It “derives its value not from physical
attributes, but from its intellectual content or other intangible properties.” I.R.M. 4.48.5.1.
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comes into existence when the assets of a company are being purchased.16
In its simplest terms, goodwill is the difference between the purchase price
of all of a company’s assets and the fair market value of a company’s
tangible assets.17 For example, if Company A purchased the assets of
Company B for $500,000, yet the fair market value of only the tangible
assets18 was $400,000, the remaining $100,000 would be allocated to
goodwill.19 The meaning behind an allocation of goodwill to part of a
purchase price of assets is that the goodwill has value: it is “the value of a
trade or business attributable to the expectancy of continued customer
patronage. This expectancy may be due to the name or reputation of a
trade or business or any other factor.”20 However, this definition is
statutorily fairly new, having been enacted only in 2000, in a regulation
under section 197.21 Section 197 itself was only enacted in 1993.22 Prior to
2000, goodwill was not otherwise defined in the United States Code,
including the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”),23 nor in any other
United States regulation.24 Commentators frequently noted the lack of a
definition.25
But courts and professionals had defined goodwill prior to 2000–the
concept has been used for accounting purposes since at least 1874,26 for
legal and tax purposes at least since 189327 and as a part of the value of a
professional business in a division of marital assets at least since 1956.28,29

16. The concept is also used in the divorce context when valuing the assets of a business for the
division of property. Goodwill as used in that context is beyond the scope of this Article.
17. ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS VALUATION FOR THE
PRACTICAL LAWYER 72 (2d ed. 2006).
18. Tangible assets are physical assets, and can be further broken down between fixed assets (e.g.,
buildings, machinery) and current assets (e.g., inventory).
19. The excess of purchase price over fair market value can also be allocated to other intangible
assets, provided that those assets are capable of being separated from the business itself, e.g., a patent.
See text accompanying note 73, infra. However, the generic definition stated above is the most used
and commonly understood definition.
20. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1).
21. Id.
22. I.R.C. § 197.
23. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555 (1993).
24. All definitions of goodwill in the regulations refer to Regulation section 1.197-2(b)(1). See,
e.g., Reg. 1.263(a)-4(c)(1)(x).
25. See Matthew A. Melone, Section 197 Complicates Planning for Retiring LLC Members, 58
TAX'N FOR ACCT. 292, 297 (1997) (“Admittedly, precise definitions of goodwill are elusive, as
evidenced by the regulations under sections 338 and 1060. These regulations, governing the allocation
of purchase price among multiple assets, define goodwill residually as the amount left over after
allocation of amounts to all other assets, which, of course, just begs the question of what exactly is
goodwill.”).
26. HUGH P. HUGHES, GOODWILL IN ACCOUNTING: A HISTORY OF THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS
(1982).
27. Metro. Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 448 (1893).
28. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250 (1956).
29. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 547 (2016). In this context, the value of goodwill can
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B. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR A C CORPORATION30 SELLER OF ASSETS

GENERALLY

When a C corporation sells its assets, the profit it makes on the sale is
taxed to the corporation (as opposed to the individual shareholders). The
rate of corporate income tax ranges between 15% and 39%.31 The
profit remaining after the payment of taxes is then available for distribution
to the shareholders. After distribution to the shareholders, the shareholders
are taxed on that distribution at their individual income tax rates. This is
the idea of double taxation32 in a nutshell: the corporation first pays a tax
on its net income, and then the shareholders pay another tax on the
remaining net income.33 Contrast this with the tax effects on owners of
pass-through entities:34 pass-through entities aren’t taxed at the entity level,
so owners of pass-through entities are taxed only once on the net income

be used to justify an unequal division of assets, which division might not hold up in an accounting or
tax context. Also, goodwill in a marital context is usually determined by state law. In any event, this
type of goodwill is beyond the scope of this article.
30. A corporation is an entity formed under state law. A corporation’s tax status is determined by
the Code. By default, for tax purposes, a corporation is a “C” corporation. I.R.C. §§ 11, 1361(b).
Corporations wishing to have a different tax status (the most common is an S corporation) must form as
a corporation under state law, and then elect to have a different tax status by filing a form with the
Service. See, e.g., IRS Form 2553, Election by a Small Business Corporation.
31. The rates for 2015 were:
For taxable income over But not over
The tax rate is
$0
$50,000
15%
$50,000
$75,000
25%
$75,000
$100,000
34%
$100,000
$335,000
39%
$335,000
$10,000,000
34%
$10,000,000
$15,000,000
35%
$15,000,000
$18,333,333
38%
$18,333,333
----35%
I.R.C. § 11.
32. Corporate distributions of assets (or the cash available after the sale of those assets) to its
shareholders were not always taxed. Under the General Utilities doctrine, a corporation recognized no
gain or loss on the distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders. Gen. Utils. & Operating Co.
v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). This benefit eroded over time, until the doctrine was completely
repealed by the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085. In
addition, corporations were prevented from circumventing the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine
by converting into an S corporation before distributing appreciated assets to its shareholders, by
imposing a corporate level tax on distributions made within 10 years of the conversion to S corporation
status. I.R.C. § 1374.
33. This assumes that the corporation distributes the remaining net income to the shareholders.
The corporation may choose to reinvest the money, e.g., expansion or new equipment. Until a
corporation distributes net income (or any income or asset) to the shareholders, the shareholders are not
taxed on it.
34. A pass-through entity is a sole proprietorship, a limited or general partnership, a limited
liability company or an S corporation. In other words, a C corporation is the only business entity form
that has a double level of taxation. However, some states do assess an entity level tax on pass-through
entities, e.g., California.
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from that pass-through entity.35
All things being equal,36 it is always more economically advantageous
for owners to receive income from a sale of assets as an owner of a passthrough entity rather than as an owner of a C corporation. The simplistic
example below, in which a corporation sells its assets for a net (pre-tax)
$11,000,000,37 shows how a pass-through entity owner would end up with
$3,080,000 more than an owner of a C corporation:
C Corporation
Net income from sale of assets
Less 35% corporate tax38
Net income available to
shareholders
Less 20% qualified dividend
rate39
Net income to shareholders
after taxes

Pass Through Entity

$11,000,000
$3,850,000
$7,150,000

$11,000,000
0
$11,000,000

$1,430,000

$ 2,200,000

$5,720,000

$ 8,800,000

C. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR BUYER OF ASSETS FROM A CORPORATION40
A buyer of assets from a corporation can have two financial benefits
from the purchase of those assets. First, the buyer gets a step up in basis
for the assets purchased,41 and second, the buyer can expense (deduct)42
35. The one downside to net income from a pass-through entity is that the owners will be taxed on
the net income, even if the company does not distribute it out to the owners.
36. And it is never equal. A sale of assets can have considerations that go far beyond tax
consequences.
37. The $11,000,000 figure was used to secure a high tax rate. See supra note 31.
38. This 35% tax rate is an approximation. See supra note 31.
39. The qualified dividend rate is the same as the capital gains rate. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). For people
with high incomes, the highest capital gains rate is 20%. § 1(h)(1)(D).
40. Whether or not the seller of assets is a C corporation or an S corporation has no effect, taxwise, for the buyer. In fact, the effect on the buyer of assets will be the same no matter what form of
entity of the seller, including limited liability companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships.
41. This result is different to the one a buyer gets from the purchase of stock. As with purchases
for most assets, an asset’s basis for a purchaser is the fair market value on the date of acquisition, which
is generally the amount that the purchaser paid for those assets. The benefit to the purchaser accrues
when the purchasing corporation sells those assets to a third party: the gain for the purchasing
corporation is the amount they receive for those assets from the third party less the amount they paid for
those assets. For example, if a selling corporation sold assets worth $1,000,000, but those assets had a
basis of $400,000 in the hands of the selling corporation, those assets would then have a basis of
$1,000,000 for the purchaser. Then assume that the purchasing corporation sold the assets to a third
party for $1,300,000. The purchasing corporation would only have a $300,000 gain. However, if the
purchasing corporation had purchased the stock of the selling corporation rather than its assets, and the
corporation sold the assets for $1,300,000, the purchasing corporation would have a $900,000 gain: the
third party selling price ($1,300,000) less the carry over basis from the selling corporation ($400,000).
42. The idea is that assets don’t last forever, so a company can deduct, as an expense, the cost of
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some of the purchase price of some of the assets via depreciation43 and
amortization.44
III. I.R.C. SECTION 197
A. PRE-SECTION 197
Prior to 1993,45 allocating part of the purchase price to intangible
assets in an asset purchase was fraught with the risk of litigation.46 Only
intangibles that had a limited life that could be ascertained with reasonable
accuracy could be amortized,47 and goodwill was not amortizable at all.48
Therefore, the more that was allocated to goodwill equaled a higher
effective purchase price of the assets, as the buyer couldn’t deduct any of
the amount allocated to goodwill. The Service frequently challenged
allocations to intangibles other than goodwill, taking the position that the
purchaser-identified non-goodwill intangible assets were really goodwill.49
A secondary problem was that the regulations didn’t define the useful life
of many intangible assets,50 so the allocation for each individual intangible

those assets over the useful life of those assets. The useful life of assets is statutorily proscribed in the
Code. See I.R.C. § 168. For example, office furniture is considered to have a useful life of 7 years, and
nonresidential real property used in a business to have a useful life of 39 years. § 168.
43. “Depreciation” is the word used for deducting the cost of certain tangible assets over that
asset's useful life. See I.R.C. § 167(a); Reg. § 1.167(a)-1. Common examples of depreciable assets
include equipment, office furniture, trucks and buildings. Common examples of non-depreciable
tangible assets include inventory and land.
44. “Amortization” is the word used for deducting the cost of certain intangible assets over that
asset's useful life, as well as certain business costs. Common examples of amortizable assets include
goodwill, patents, and trademarks; and examples of amortizable business costs include start-up costs
and the costs of research and development. In addition, there are some assets that can only be
amortized if purchased, e.g., goodwill. See Chapter 8, Amortization, in the Service’s Publication 535,
for a more in-depth discussion of this topic. I.R.S. PUBLICATION 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES,
Amortization, (Jan. 7, 2016).
45. Section 197 of the Code was enacted in 1993.
46. Gregory M. Beil, Comment, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy
Over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 733 (1995).
47. § 167.
48. See Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (“If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be
of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can
be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation
allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not
limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely
because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill. For rules with respect to
organizational expenditures, see section 248 and the regulations thereunder. For rules with respect to
trademark and trade name expenditures, see section 177 and the regulations thereunder.”) (emphasis
added).
49. See Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973)
(outlining several cases where taxpayers were unsuccessful in appealing for an amortization deduction).
50. However, the regulations under section 197 do define the useful life of some intangibles, e.g.,
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asset had to be supported, which involved costly appraisals and expert
opinions.51 As the Code and regulations had so little guidance on what an
amortizable intangible was, the courts ended up developing the definitions,
which then evolved into the idea that an amortizable intangible asset had to
have an ascertainable value that was separate from any other asset,
including goodwill, and had a limited and determinable life.52 And, even
with expert opinions and statistical information, the answers were never
clear, and the Service seemed to challenge them all.53 The issues involved
(a) whether certain intangibles could be amortized at all,54 (b) if certain
intangibles had a “reasonably ascertainable useful life”55 and (c) how to
allocate the purchase price of various intangibles.56 A purchaser would
want to have as many assets be amortizable as possible, using the shortest
useful life available, and the Service would want as much of the intangible
assets to be non-amortizable as possible. Chaos ensued.
The allocation of the purchase price to various intangible assets had an
effect on the seller as well, in that the inability of the buyer to amortize a
large part of the purchase price would decrease the amount that the buyer
was willing to pay for the assets. In addition, as the seller would want to
allocate as much of the purchase price as possible to assets with higher
bases, 57 evaluating the allocation choices to arrive at an overall purchase
price complicated the negotiations. Also, the parties would need to agree
on the allocation of the purchase price to the various assets58 and the
scenarios had to take into account the risk of the Service not respecting the
allocation.
On the eve of the passage of section 197,59 the Supreme Court decided
Newark Morning Ledger v. United States,60 which opened the door to
patents, which were recoverable over a 17-year period. Before the enactment of section 197, the only
code section that referenced amortization of intangibles was section 167, and the regulations thereunder.
See Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
51. Beil, supra note 46, at 736.
52. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1993).
53. Government estimates from 1991 were that the Service had assessed $8 billion against
taxpayers who amortized intangibles that the Service claimed were goodwill. Estimates from 1993
show that the Service made over $14.4 billion in proposed adjustments relating to amortization of
intangible assets. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property
Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2004).
54. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 568.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The seller would want to allocate as much of the purchase price to assets with the highest
bases, in order to reduce the amount of taxable gain.
58. Both the seller and the buyer file a IRS Form 8594, Asset Acquisition Statement Under Section
1060, in which each side allocates the purchase price to the various assets. Although there is no law
that requires the amounts on the forms to agree, it would be a red flag if they did not.
59. The bill passed on August 6, 1993, and President Clinton signed it into law on August 10,
1993.
60. Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 566.
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allowing some intangible assets that might previously been thought of as
goodwill to be amortizable, provided that those assets had an ascertainable
value and a limited useful life. However, with the passage of section 197,
the huge effect that this case could have had went away.61
B. IRC SECTION 197
Section 197 was added as a part of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA-93”).62 The addition of section 197
added three major changes to the amortization of intangibles: first, it
defined which intangibles were amortizable,63 it now set a standard 15-year
amortization schedule for section 197 intangibles,64 and it allowed
amortization of goodwill for the first time.65 At first glance, section 197
saved money for a buyer of a business with intangible assets: the buyer no
longer had the costs of experts to prove that the intangibles had a
reasonably ascertainable life and how long that life was, and the buyer also
no longer had the costs of litigation from the Service about the existence of
intangibles or their useful life. The intangibles were defined in the
regulations, and all intangibles were amortized over 15 years. Now, a
buyer wouldn’t care about the allocation between different intangibles,
because all would be amortizable over 15 years.66 However, other
allocation problems arose.

61. On its face, it can look like the enactment of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in 1993, Pub.
L. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312, was a reaction to Newark Morning Ledger. See, e.g., Catherine L. Hammond,
Note and Comment, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: Section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code
Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915 (1995). However, Congress had been working on adding
section 197 for several years, and passed the law on August 6, 1993. Newark Morning Ledger had only
been decided four months earlier, on April 20, 1993.
62. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312. Also known
colloquially as the Deficit Reduction Act of 1993, this Act was quite controversial at the time, as it
raised the limit on personal income taxes to 39.6%, and corporations to 35%. It passed the Senate with
a 51-50 vote, with Vice President Al Gore voting to break the tie. Roll Call Votes, U.S. SENATE, 103RD
CONGRESS, 1ST SESS., Aug. 6, 1993, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote
_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote=00247. The addition of Section 197 was only a small part
of the Act.
63. I.R.C. § 197(d). The section 197 intangibles, in addition to goodwill, are going concern value
(§ 197(d)(1)(B)); workforce in place (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(i)); business records, including customer lists
(§ 197(d)(1)(C)(ii)); patents and copyrights (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii)); customer-based intangibles
(§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iv)); supplier-based intangibles (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(v); and the catch-all phrase “any other
similar item” (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(vi)); as well as governmental licenses and permits (§ 197(d)(1)(D));
covenants not to compete, but only in connection with an acquisition (§ 197(d)(1)(E)); and any
franchise, trademark or trade name (§ 197(d)(1)(F)).
64. § 197(a).
65. § 197(d)(1)(A).
66. Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389, n.11 (2008).
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C. ALLOCATION OF PURCHASE PRICE TO GOODWILL.
The acceptance of goodwill as an amortizable asset raised a different
type of allocation problem for some buyers of assets. Often, when a buyer
purchases the assets of a small business and those assets include goodwill,
the terms of sale will almost always include some sort of covenant not to
compete from the individual sellers of the business. The buyer will want to
insure that the seller is not going to restart the same or a similar business
down the road and compete with the just-purchased business. As goodwill
includes “the expectancy of continued customer patronage,”67 a covenant
not to compete is the insurance that the expectancy will be fulfilled. As a
result, goodwill and a covenant not to compete often go hand-in-hand in a
sale of assets, and part of the purchase price has to be allocated between
those two intangibles. The buyer will not care about the allocation between
the two–both goodwill and a covenant not to compete are amortizable over
a 15-year period. The seller, however, will care a great deal: goodwill is a
capital asset68 and the seller will only pay taxes on the amount allocated to
goodwill at capital gains tax rates,69 and, a covenant not to compete is taxed
at ordinary income rates.70
IV. PERSONAL GOODWILL AND THE CLOSELY HELD
BUSINESS
A. OVERVIEW.
Goodwill is likely to be a part of the sale of a closely held business.
Often, the owners are the ones on the front lines, running the day-to-day
operations of the business. The owners have built up the business
themselves, and have built customer loyalty based on personal
relationships. When a buyer purchases a closely held business, it is often
purchasing that customer loyalty, expecting that the customers will want to
continue to patronize the same old business, even with new faces running
it. The challenge for the buyer is how to keep customer loyalty when the
customers are no longer seeing the old faces, especially when the owner is
providing a professional service, e.g., an attorney, physician, dentist or real
estate agent–there is only one face to the business, and it is the face of the
one who is leaving. In those situations, it is often not enough to just have
the owner agree to not compete with the business it is selling, the owner
67. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1).
68. See Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.1963) (“It is settled that good will, as
a distinct property right, is a capital asset under the tax laws.”).
69. This is true only if the seller is a pass-through entity or a sole proprietor. C corporations do not
have capital gains tax rates.
70. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir. 1967).
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will also need to provide consulting services to the new owner, e.g.,
introducing the new owner to customers, suppliers and vendors, and
community organizations. These consulting services also become part of
the purchase price: the buyer agrees to pay the owner over time for the
seller’s time and effort in integrating the buyer into the seller’s business.
The seller will want to allocate as little of the purchase price as possible to
the consulting agreement: not only will it be ordinary income, but it will
also be subject to self-employment taxes.71 The buyer, on the other hand,
will want as much of the purchase price as possible allocated to the
consulting agreement: the buyer will be able to immediately deduct the
payments made under the consulting agreement, as opposed to amortizing a
covenant not to compete or goodwill over a 15-year period.
When the seller is a C corporation, that corporation will be indifferent
to the various allocations between intangibles, as a C corporation has only
one tax rate, so whether or not a gain is from a capital asset or a non-capital
asset won’t affect the tax assessed on the gain. The shareholders of that C
corporation won’t care either–they’ll only bemoan the fact that the money
available to be distributed to them is less because the C corporation had to
first pay taxes on the sale.
As a result, a C corporation seller will normally prefer a stock sale
rather than an asset sale: the C corporation shareholder will pay capital
gains only on the difference between their basis in the stock and the amount
they received for their stock from the buyer. However, a buyer will not
prefer a stock purchase, because it will have paid out lots of money with
nothing to immediately expense, and it will not get a step up in basis of the
seller’s assets. In addition, a buyer cannot pick and choose among assets
when it is purchasing stock. Then, to add insult to injury, when that buyer
eventually decides to sell its acquired assets, it is now going to have to pay
a corporate tax on the difference between the sale price of the assets and
the basis in the assets, which basis was not stepped up at the first sale.
B. PERSONAL GOODWILL
For a closely held C corporation that is selling its assets, there is a way
for an owner (shareholder) of the corporation to avoid at least some of the
double taxation associated with a sale of assets: to allocate some of the
purchase price to the owner directly as personal goodwill, rather than the
sale of goodwill held by the C corporation. That scenario allows some of
the proceeds to avoid going through the corporation (avoiding the corporate
tax) and be taxed at the capital gains tax rate of the owner.
Using the same example as in Section II.B. as a starting point, this
second example shows how the owner of a C corporation benefits from a
71. I.R.C. § 1402(b).
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personal goodwill allocation. First, a reminder of the net amount a
shareholder from a C corporation takes home after taxes without an
allocation to goodwill:
Net income from sale of assets
Less 35% corporate tax
Net income available to shareholders
Less 20% qualified dividend rate72
Net income to shareholders after taxes

C Corporation
$11,000,000
$3,850,000
$7,150,000
$1,430,000
$5,720,000

Next, assume that the total amount paid for the business is the same:
$11,000,000. However, now only $7,000,000 goes directly to the
corporation, and the difference, $4,000,000, goes to the shareholder
directly as “personal goodwill.”73 The shareholder’s net amount after taxes
is now $6,895,400.
Net income from sale of
assets
Less 34%74 corporate tax
Net income available to
shareholders
Less 20% qualified dividend
rate
Net income to shareholders
after taxes
Total Net Income to
Shareholder75

C Corporation
$7,000,000

Personal Goodwill
$4,000,000

$2,380,000
$4,620,000

0
$4,000,000

$924,600

$ 800,000

$3,695,400

$3,200,000

$6,895,400

Obviously, the benefit to the shareholder in any transaction depends
on the amount of the purchase price that is allocated to personal goodwill,
but the shareholder will always benefit if some portion of the purchase
price isn’t subject to a corporate tax.

72. This refers to the qualified dividend rate for incomes over $450,000.
73. This allocation is completely arbitrary.
74. As the net income is less than $10,000,000, the corporate tax rate is 34%. I.R.C. § 11.
75. This table is not an either/or table as were the earlier tables. This table shows the aggregate
path of money that go to the shareholder – one through a corporate distribution, and one directly from
the seller.
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C. MARTIN ICE CREAM V. COMMISSIONER76
1. Overview
Any discussion about personal goodwill always starts with the 1998
case of Martin Ice Cream v. Commissioner, which opened the doors for
personal goodwill to be a component in the sale of assets from a C
corporation.77 The court in Martin Ice Cream held that, in the sale of
intangible assets of a business, it is possible under certain circumstances to
designate some of those intangible assets as belonging to an individual
shareholder rather than the business itself. Although the court in Martin
Ice Cream never uses the words “personal goodwill” nor does it even refer
to the assets that belong to the individual as “goodwill,” this case has long
been considered as the first case in which part of the purchase price of a
business can be allocated to personal goodwill.78 Although cases before
Martin Ice Cream did hold that personal relationships of an individual
shareholder were separate from corporate intangible assets,79 a court had
not been faced with allocating part of a purchase price in an acquisition to
an individual shareholder.
2. Background of the case
The case of Martin Ice Cream started with an argument between a
father and his son. Arnold Strassberg, the dad, had been in the ice cream
distributor business since right after World War II, at about the same time
that his son, Martin, was born.80 By the 1960s, Arnold had been pretty
successful at getting ice cream products into big supermarkets–in fact, he
was the one who came up with the idea of packaging ice cream by different
brand names, and marketing different ice cream products. Before Arnold
started differentiating between different ice cream brands, ice cream had
been sold in big generic tubs.81 Arnold was particularly good at building
relationships with his big supermarket customers, but he perhaps was not
the best businessperson. In fact, his first ice cream distributor company
went belly up in the1960s82 after he lost a major supplier.83
76. 110 T.C. 189 (1998).
77. Id.
78. Thomas O. Wells & Daniel Lampert, Sale of Personal Goodwill – The Executive's Parachute,
79 Fʟᴀ. Bᴀʀ J. 31 (2005).
79. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 207.
80. Martin Strassberg was born in 1945. Locate a Person Nationwide, LEXISNEXIS, PUBLIC
RECORDS, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://advance.lexis.com/publicrecordshome?crid=9821ddded0ce-47ae-8832-aa9654475dae.
81. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 192.
82. See id. (explaining that Arnold formed his first company, Arnold’s Ice Cream, in the midfifties, but filed for bankruptcy in the 1960s).
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In 1971, Arnold decided to start another ice cream distribution
company, which he named Martin Ice Cream (“MIC”).84 He apparently
continued to do what he did well – cultivate and maintain the relationships
he had with the big grocery stores. In 1974, the founder (and inventor) of
Haagen-Dazs, Ruben Mattus, approached Arnold about using Arnold’s
customer relationships to help Haagen-Dazs get into the big supermarkets.
Arnold agreed in a handshake, and then he went on to be the first ice cream
distributor for Haagen-Dazs, as well as to revolutionize the retail market
for premium ice cream.85
Meanwhile, Martin, Arnold’s son, started to work for the business–
part time at first in 1971, and then full time by 1975. Martin did not like all
the schmoozing that his dad had to do with the big supermarkets, so Martin
focused on the small independent stores, where all he had to do was
supervise the loading of trucks, as he hired route salesmen to do the actual
selling.86 Martin could remain in the background.87
By the late 1970s, Arnold had become so successful with the HaagenDazs business that Mattus, the Haagen-Dazs founder, asked Arnold to join
him in a partnership on the West Coast. Arnold said no. However, Arnold
did want to expand his business on the East Coast. His son, Martin, did
not, and that is when the arguments started between them. Arnold and
Martin carried this disagreement throughout the 1980s, especially when
one of Arnold’s other expansion ideas failed miserably.88
Pillsbury purchased Haagen-Dazs from Mattus in 1983.89 At about
the same time, Ben & Jerry’s, an up and coming premium ice cream
producer and a competitor of Haagen-Dazs, asked Arnold to distribute Ben
& Jerry’s ice cream.90 Arnold, who was still distributing Haagen-Dazs
products to four supermarket chains, asked Haagen-Dazs for permission to
distribute its competitor’s ice cream, but Haagen-Dazs refused,91 giving
even more weight to the importance of Arnold’s supermarket contacts.

83. Id.
84. Initially, Martin owned 100% of the stock of Martin Ice Cream, as Arnold was trying to avoid
any lingering bankruptcy claimants. Id. In 1979, Arnold became a 51% shareholder. Id. However, the
record is silent about how he obtained this 51% share, and it ends up not being important to this case.
85. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 193.
86. Id. at 194.
87. Id. at 193–94.
88. Id. at 196–97.
89. Pamela G. Hollie, Pillsbury’s Ice Cream Chain Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1983, p. D1.
90. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 194.
91. This was a common position that Haagen-Dazs took throughout the 1980's: telling distributors
that if they distributed Haagen-Dazs, they could not also distribute Ben and Jerry’s. It did not appear to
be a contractual right; rather, it was just something they could insist on because they were a big deal.
Ben & Jerry’s sued them several times, including in an anti-trust matter. Haagen-Dazs had even agreed
in a settlement with Ben & Jerry’s that Haagen-Dazs would not engage in many of its exclusivity
practices. Ben & Jerry’s had to take Haagen-Dazs to court to enforce it. See Ben & Jerry's Homemade,
Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 693 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Mass. 1987).
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One of the first contractual actions that Haagen-Dazs/Pillsbury asked for
was that the only premium ice cream that Arnold could distribute was
Haagen-Dazs.
In late 1985 or early 1986, Haagen-Dazs again approached Arnold
about acquiring access to Arnold’s relationships with the supermarkets.
The reason for this was two-fold: first, Haagen-Dazs was planning on
doing its own distribution from its own distribution centers and second (and
most important), Haagen-Dazs wanted to get rid of a potential competitor.92
This offer from Haagen-Dazs came at a good time: at this point,
Martin and Arnold were really not getting along, and Martin did not want
to work with Arnold any longer.93 Negotiations between Arnold and
Haagen-Dazs started in March 1987, which soon broke down and started
up again, and ran all the way through May 1988.94 Starting in May, the
negotiations started in earnest, with proposals given back and forth on
paper.
It was what was in these proposals from Arnold that helped the
outcome of this case to go towards an allocation of part of the purchase
price for intangible assets to go to Arnold personally. An early proposal
from Arnold to Haagen-Dazs included $1.5 million for the business, as well
as individual payments to both Arnold and Martin ($450,000 and $250,000,
respectively) for consulting services and covenants not to compete. Arnold
also had the purchase documents show that both, he and his company,
Strassberg Ice Cream Distributors, Inc. (“SIC”) (a subsidiary that MIChad
formed, separating the business into a piece for Martin and a piece for
Arnold) were the sellers, and not solely his company.95 The finished
document stated that all of the Haagen-Dazs distribution rights that would
be transferred to Haagen-Dazs were owned by SIC, and also said that
Haagen-Dazs was not purchasing any of the non-big supermarket business
of MIC.96 The final allocation of the purchase price for the assets was
$300,000 for “records” and $1,200,000 for “Sellers’ Rights,”97 and the
contract had both SIC and Arnold as the sellers. The bill of sale signed by
Arnold was for “all existing customer lists, price lists, historical sales
records, promotional allowance and rebate records,” as well as “other

92. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 194–96.
93. Id. at 197.
94. Id.
95. Arnold and Martin had formed a new corporation, Strassberg Ice Cream Distributors, Inc.
(“SIC”), which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Martin Ice Cream (“MIC”). Id. at 198. MIC put all
its assets relating to the big supermarket business (i.e., not any independent grocery store assets of
Martin’s side of the business) into SIC. Id. at 200. Arnold then gave some of his stock in MIC back to
MIC in exchange for all of the stock in SIC. Arnold apparently kept some MIC stock, but the opinion
doesn’t say how much. Id. at 210.
96. Id. at 202.
97. Id.
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business records,” and “the goodwill associated therewith.”98 Arnold also
signed a document that assigned all of these items to Haagen-Dazs, and he
signed it in his capacity as president of SIC as well as for himself
individually. Arnold signed a consulting and non-compete agreement with
Haagen-Dazs for an additional $450,000. After the sale closed, HaagenDazs wrote a check to SIC (not Arnold) for $1,430,340,99 which is the
amount Arnold used when he filed his tax form for SIC, in which he
reported that he would be reporting a gain of $1,430,340 on his personal
tax return for 1988.100 MIC didn’t report anything at all about the sale to
Haagen-Dazs when it filed its 1988 return.101
Although the facts of the case are all about Arnold and his
relationships with the supermarkets, the eventual Service audit wasn’t of
Arnold or SIC, it was of MIC.102 The Service believed that the $1,430,340
that went to SIC from Haagen-Dazs should have first been counted as
having been constructively received by MIC before being distributed out to
SIC. If the Service was right, it would have meant that MIC would have to
pay a corporate level of tax on that receipt prior to its distribution to SIC.103
3. The court’s ruling
Luckily for MIC, the court held that the $1,430,340 received by SIC
was really for intangible assets that were owned only by Arnold, and that
those assets had never been owned by MIC.104 Since those assets had never
been corporate assets of MIC, there was no corporate level of tax assessed
on MIC.
The factors that led to the court’s decision were:
1. Both Arnold, as an individual, and Arnold, as president of SIC,
98. Id. at 204.
99. The final price was reduced to this amount following an agreed-to audit and sales price formula
in the purchase agreement. Id. at 214.
100. Id. at 205.
101. This is interesting because Martin, MIC and Arnold had the same accountant: Rudolph
Bergwerk. Id. at 204. Another interesting aside is that the Court allowed Bergwerk to be MIC’s expert
witness on the value of MIC, even in light of Bergwerk’s work as the accountant for everybody and
Bergwerk’s lack of appraiser qualifications, and then Bergwerk screwed up the tax returns of MIC,
which MIC ultimately paid a penalty for. Id. at 235. Bergwerk was a sole practitioner in the small
bedroom community of Livingston, New Jersey, where Arnold and Martin both lived. Locate a Person
Nationwide, LEXISNEXIS, PUBLIC RECORDS, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://advance.lexis.com/
publicrecordshome/?pdmfid=1000200&crid=aba0d96a-bd6f-41a3-9141-a99713bc14b8&ecomp=7n5k
k&prid=c30d8ddd-57ac-4141-9a99-bdc5fb55e8a9.
102. If MIC’s accountant, Rudolph Bergwerk, had properly filed MIC’s IRS Form 1120S, would
the Service have audited MIC? Even if the Service disagreed with the characterization of the proceeds
of the sale of assets, the figures on their respective IRS Forms 1120S would have matched for both MIC
and SIC, and perhaps not have triggered an audit. See Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 204-05 (outlining
several discrepancies in MIC’s IRS Form 1120S).
103. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 206.
104. Id.
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signed the purchase agreement documents.105 This showed that Arnold
himself was a party to the sale of assets, so he could properly receive part
of the payout.
2. The contract to sell the assets showed two different types of assets:
the intangible assets, which the court said belonged to Arnold, and the
business records, which the court said belonged to SIC (and therefore had
belonged to MIC before those records had been transferred to SIC, and
therefore MIC would need to pay corporate taxes on that).106
3. The personal relationships with the supermarket that belonged to
Arnold personally pre-dated the start of MIC107 (which lent credence to the
idea that MIC didn’t own those relationships, especially since Arnold had
never transferred those relationships to MIC).
4. The success of the supermarket distribution business was
dependent entirely on Arnold personally108 (and therefore those
relationships would have no value to MIC if Arnold were not working for
MIC).
5. Mr. Mattus (the Haagen-Dazs founder) wanted to partner with
Arnold personally, not with MIC.109
6. Arnold hadn’t ever entered into a covenant not to compete or an
employment agreement with MIC (which meant that Arnold’s personal
relationships and distribution expertise had never been transferred to or
become the property of MIC).111 The court went on to say that even if
there had been an agreement, some of the purchase price still would have
belonged to Arnold personally, because of Mr. Mattus’ desire to work with
Arnold personally.112 The lack of an employment agreement and lack of a
covenant not to compete between Arnold and MIC is almost universally
acknowledged as the main reason for the Court’s decision.113 In
subsequent cases, this factor became one of the most important in a court
respecting an allocation of personal goodwill to an owner of a
corporation.114
7. The disparity between the price paid by Haagen-Dazs to Arnold
and SIC and the value of MIC before the split off of the supermarket
business115 added to the point that there was excess value that could only
have belonged to Arnold, the one variable taken away in the calculation.
105. Id. at 204.
106. Id. at 206–07.
107. Id. at 207.
108. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 207.
109. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 208.
113. See, e.g., Wells & Bergez, supra note 2, at 191.
114. See Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2008); see also Part IV.E.1, infra.
115. This is the idea that the difference between the amount paid by Haagen-Dazs and the value of
Martin Ice Cream as an on-going business was the premium paid for Arnold personally.
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8. The original purchase documents prepared by Haagen-Dazs
showed the sellers being Martin, MIC, SIC and Arnold. Arnold had the
documents changed to show only SIC and Arnold as the sellers.116 This
showed that the parties intended (and thus were part of the negotiations) to
have Arnold as a seller.
9. MIC was out of the negotiations a month before the deal closed
which gave weight to the idea that this transaction was properly attributed
only to SIC and Arnold.
There were two factors that the court downplayed or overlooked in
reaching its decision, factors that courts have since found to be extremely
important in a finding of personal goodwill: first, the purchase agreement
did not allocate the purchase price between Arnold and SIC – in fact,
Haagen-Dazs only wrote one check, and it was to SIC.117 The court chose
to go with substance over form in order to find that the payment was
allocable between Arnold and MIC.118 Although cases since Martin Ice
Cream that have not allowed an allocation of personal goodwill relied in
part on a stated allocation that didn’t include personal goodwill, Martin Ice
Cream can be distinguished because it did not allocate anything at all.
Second, there were documents prepared by MIC and Arnold that showed
MIC distributing the distribution rights that supposedly were owned by
Arnold personally.119 Again, the court went with substance over form,
ignoring what the documents themselves said.
So, for the court in Martin Ice Cream, the underlying reality of the
deal trumped the documents themselves. Interestingly, it was the
underlying reality as determined by the court, and not what the parties
believed the underlying reality to be, that won the day. Arnold believed
that his tax liability came from the distribution of the assets from SIC, and
not that the distribution went to him personally.120 The result to Arnold
would have been less proceeds, and therefore a lesser tax.
Even though the takeaway from Martin Ice Cream is typically that
goodwill in a corporate acquisition can sometimes be allocated to personal
goodwill, Martin Ice Cream never discussed personal goodwill. Rather, its
holding referred to intangible assets.121
After Martin Ice Cream, what courts have actually given weight to is
not the existence or lack of an employment agreement or covenant not to

116. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 198. The court also noted that it would have viewed this
change negatively if it had been at the last minute. Id. at 214–15.
117. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 204, n. 12.
118. Id. at 206.
119. The court waved off this problem by holding that “[w]hat petitioner did not own, petitioner
could not transfer” rather than using the transfer documents to show evidence of ownership of those
assets by MIC. Id. at 209.
120. Id. at 202.
121. Id. at 206.
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compete prior to a sale of assets. What the cases have in common is what
happened during the negotiations of the asset purchase. As the court said
in Martin Ice Cream, “[t]he substance of a transaction can be found in the
negotiations leading up to the closing.”122 This factor is the one that runs
through all but one123 of the personal goodwill cases after Martin Ice
Cream.
Always overlooked in analyses of the Martin Ice Cream opinion is the
judge who wrote the opinion, Renato Beghe. Judge Beghe had long shown
an interest in the income tax treatment of allocations of intangibles in the
sale of a business, predating his position as a judge and long before his
decision in Martin Ice Cream.124 Interestingly, Beghe also recommended
that parties to an acquisition start talking about allocations to intangibles
early in the negotiations in order to back up an allocation to each one,125
just as he stated in Martin Ice Cream.126 This viewpoint is actually what is
in the personal goodwill cases that followed.
D. NORWALK V. COMMISSIONER127
No discussion of Martin Ice Cream is complete without talking about
its unofficial companion case, Norwalk v. Commissioner.128 Both cases
were decided in 1998, three months apart, and Norwalk came out with a
similar result to Martin Ice Cream in that the court found goodwill to rest
with the shareholders rather than the corporation.129 However, the decision
was not based on negotiations, because this case did not involve an asset
sale.
Norwalk was the case that opened the door to the use of goodwill in
professional services run through C corporations. Martin Ice Cream is
actually an anomaly, in that the goodwill held by the individual
shareholder, Arnold Strassberg, was for his work as a salesperson. Most
personal goodwill cases involve people who are in a professional service
industry, e.g., accountants, attorneys, doctors and dentists, as the business
of these people is more likely to count on their personal relationships with
122. Id. at 212.
123. See, e.g., Norwalk v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1998). However, although
Norwalk dealt with personal goodwill, it was not a sale of assets case.
124. Renato Beghe, Income Tax Treatment of Covenants not to Compete, Consulting Agreements
and Transfers of Goodwill, 30 TAX LAWYER 587 (1977). Beghe published this article as a partner at
the firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn in New York, before he became a Tax Court judge. Press
Release, United States Tax Court, Obituary for Judge Renato Beghe, July 12, 2012,
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/ 071312.pdf.
125. Beghe, supra note 123, at 620.
126. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 215.
127. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1998).
128. Norwalk was decided after Martin Ice Cream by two months, and cites Martin Ice Cream. Id.
at 214.
129. Id. at 216.
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their customers.
Norwalk is the story of two accountants, Robert DeMarta and William
Norwalk, who formed an accounting practice as a professional corporation
in 1985,130 and what happened when they liquidated that practice and
joined another accounting firm.
After forming the corporation, and even though DeMarta and
Norwalk were the only shareholders, DeMarta and Norwalk each signed
a 5 year employment agreement with the corporation, which also
contained a covenant not to compete with the corporation during the
term of the agreement.131 The employment agreement would terminate
in 1990, by its terms.
After seven years, which was 2 years after the employment agreement
had terminated, DeMarta and Norwalk decided to join the accounting firm
of Ireland, San Filippo.132 Apparently, the two accountants felt that since
they weren’t profitable together, they would join a larger accounting
firm.133 To accomplish the transition, the DeMarta & Norwalk board of
directors (presumably just DeMarta and Norwalk, although the opinion is
silent) elected to liquidate the corporation and distribute all of the
corporation’s assets to its two shareholders.134 The only tangible assets that
the corporation had were furniture, equipment and accounts receivable, all
of which DeMarta and Norwalk later individually contributed to Ireland,
San Filippo135 for their partnership interests in Ireland, San Filippo.136

130. Id. at 210. The court opinion shows the name of the corporation as “DeMarta & Norwalk,
CPA’s, Inc.,” but the name of the corporation was actually “De Marta & Norwalk, Certified Public
Accountants, an Accountancy Corporation.” The correct name shows that the company was a
professional corporation under California law, because of the ending 3 words. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code § 5150. However, a professional corporation can be an S corporation or a C corporation. From
the opinion, we don’t know what type of corporation it was.
131. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 212. The record is silent on why DeMarta and Norwalk chose
to enter into this employment agreement. They could have more easily done the same thing with a
shareholders agreement, but the cost of drafting that agreement might not have been deductible for the
corporation, as the corporation might not have been a party to the shareholders agreement.
132. Id. The opinion describes this as DeMarta and Norwalk choosing to liquidate their accounting
firm, and then 6 months later, deciding to join Ireland, San Filippo. It begs credulity to say that this
wasn’t in the works when they decided to liquidate, given the amount of time it would take to liquidate
the firm, and the fact that so many employees of the corporation also went to Ireland, San Filippo.
133. Ireland, San Filippo was a large accounting firm (for a regional accounting firm), having 16
partners and 90 employees as of 2009. Press Release, Ireland, San Filippo, (June 4, 2009). Ireland, San
Filippo changed its name to Sensiba, San Filippo in 2009. Ireland San Filippo Announces Name
Change to Sensiba San Filippo, MARKETING BUSINESS WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 2009, at 213. Norwalk is
now the “Tax Partner-in-Charge.” Press Release, Sensiba, San Filippo, Sensiba San Filippo Appoints
William Norwalk Tax Partner-in-Charge, last accessed Sept. 11, 2016, http://www.ssfllp.com/sensibasan-filippo-appoints-william-norwalk-tax-partner-in-charge/.
134. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213.
135. Id. at 212.
136. Id. Norwalk and DeMarta valued the equipment and furniture at $59,455, and their initial
capital accounts at Ireland, San Filippo were a total of $67,243. Id. Presumably, therefore, the accounts
receivables were valued at $7,788.
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Apparently,137 the corporation distributed no intangible assets.
Some facts that were important to the court in deciding this case: first,
when DeMarta and Norwalk went with Ireland, San Filippo, so did three
other CPAs and five staff.138 Within 4 months, two of the three CPAs left
to start their own firm, taking at least 92 clients with them.139 Five years
after the liquidation of the corporation,140 Ireland, San Filippo had only
retained about 10% of the clients that DeMarta and Norwalk had brought
with them.141 The court would use these facts to show that there was no
goodwill to be had.142
After the dust settled, along came the Service, who claimed that the
corporation really did distribute intangible assets to Norwalk and
DeMarta.143 The Service determined that the corporation’s client list was
worth $266,000, and corporate goodwill was worth $369,000,144 for a total
of $635,000. What makes this different from Martin Ice Cream is that in
Martin Ice Cream, the parties were in disagreement about whom to allocate
a distribution of actual cash, but in Norwalk, the Service was saying that
Norwalk and DeMarta owed taxes on $635,000, an amount they had never
actually received. Also, and obviously, Norwalk was not an acquisition
where actual money changed hands, as it did in Martin Ice Cream.
The court in Norwalk held that (1) the corporation had no goodwill to
distribute when it liquidated,145 and (2) that any customer-based intangibles
of the corporation belonged personally to Norwalk and DeMarta.146
Although the court cited Martin Ice Cream, it based its opinion more on
MacDonald v. Commissioner,147 a case in which the Service also tried to
attribute a dollar figure to goodwill in a liquidation in which MacDonald
had received no cash. As in Martin Ice Cream, the court in Norwalk was
persuaded by the lack of a covenant not to compete between the
137. The opinion is silent about whether DeMarta or Norwalk distributed any corporate intangibles
to themselves, but if they had, it would have likely been in the opinion, since intangibles was the main
subject of the opinion.
138. Id. at 213.
139. One of the CPAs that left, Thomas Tang, says that he was with Ireland, San Filippo for six
months. However, he declines to name them, only referring to them as a “six office regional accounting
firm.” See Partner Profiles, TANG & LEE, LLP, last accessed Sept. 4, 2016, http://tanglee.com/profile/.
140. Although the corporation liquidated in 1992, it never dissolved, but it also didn’t keep the
corporation active. The California Franchise Tax Board suspended the corporation in 2000. The
corporation continue to exist, suspended. Business Entity Detail #C1187124, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY
OF STATE (2016), http://kepler.sos.ca.gov.
141. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213.
142. Id. at 214.
143. Id. at 212.
144. Id. at 215. The Service’s expert determined that the value of the corporation was a total of
$870,000, so that after subtracting the intangibles, there would be $238,000 remaining. Id. The opinion
is silent about to what the $238,000 was attributed.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 216.
147. 3 T.C. 720 (1944).
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corporation and its shareholders or any other agreement between the
shareholders and the corporation in which the personal relationships of the
shareholder accountants had been transferred to the corporation.148 The
court also may have been swayed by the Service’s underhanded method of
calculating the value of the intangible assets:149 first, it based its opinion on
the value of the goodwill on an approximation of future earnings, but the
cost percentages that the Service plugged into its formula were based on
industry standards rather than the actual operating costs of this particular
corporation.150 Second, the Service valued the customer lists and goodwill
as though there was a covenant not to compete in place at the time of
liquidation,151 even though the covenants not to compete had expired two
years prior.
Norwalk is contrasted from Martin Ice Cream in that Norwalk didn’t
involve any negotiations for the purchase of the accounting business. The
value that the Service attributed to goodwill of the accounting business did
not involve cash, so there was no monetary figure for the two accountants
to discuss with Ireland, San Filippo. Therefore, negotiations played no part
in the court’s decision, which is different from how other cases on personal
goodwill have been decided.
For the next 10 years after Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk were
decided, very few cases even talked about personal goodwill. However,
during that time, commentators were writing about how to use personal
goodwill in the sale of corporate assets, relying only on Martin Ice Cream
and Norwalk.152 Then, starting in 2008, three cases dealt with the issue of
personal goodwill,153 but those cases received very little attention, and all
three courts didn’t allow an allocation of personal goodwill. It was not
until 2011, with Howard v. United States,154 that personal goodwill was
brought back into the limelight.

148. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 214.
149. This is pure conjecture on the author’s part, based on the tone of the opinion when discussing
this issue, as well as the background of the judge, Robert Ruwe. Judge Ruwe had worked for the
Service as a special agent in the Intelligence Division for 7 years before and during law school, and then
for 17 years as an attorney before being appointed to the Tax Court in 1987. Judge Robert Paul Ruwe,
UNITED STATES TAX COURT, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/
judges/ruwe.htm.
150. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 215.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 9.
153. Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2008); Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d
183 (1st Cir. 2009); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (2010); see Part IV.E, infra.
154. 448 F.App'x 752 (9th Cir. 2011).
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E. THE PROGENY OF MARTIN ICE CREAM
But first, the 2008–2010 cases: the facts leading up to these cases
actually occurred much closer in time to Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk.
These cases showed practitioners struggling with the requirements of
having an allocation of personal goodwill be respected by the courts. What
happened was that with each case, practitioners tried to use what came
before them to try to qualify for this allocation, but none worked.
1. Solomon v. Commissioner155
Solomon was the first personal goodwill case to be decided after
Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk.156 Unfortunately for the taxpayers in
Solomon, the court did not rule in their favor as it had for the taxpayers in
Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk.
Solomon was another father-son working together story, with Robert
Solomon (the father) and Richard Solomon (the son) selling a portion of
their business, Solomon Colors, Inc., to a competitor, Prince Manufacturing
Co.157 The tax court held that the cash Robert and Richard, their wives and
Solomon Colors, Inc. (together, the “Solomon Parties”) received in the sale
was not for their personal goodwill as they had claimed on their tax returns,
but rather was for their covenants not to compete after the sale158 (which
would then be taxed as ordinary income rather than as capital gain).
Interestingly, this was not what the Service had asked the court to order,
instead, it was a third option determined by the court on its own
initiative.159 The Service maintained that the money that Robert and
Richard and their wives received in the sale was attributed to Solomon
Color’s sale of its customer list, which was therefore dividend income to

155. 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389.
156. Ten years had passed since those cases had been decided, but perhaps it is not surprising that it
took ten years for the first case to appear. After Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk were decided in 1998,
taxpayers relying on those cases for subsequent years who would then have had their allocations
challenged by the Service would likely not be finally heard for ten years. For example, although
Solomon was decided in 2008, it was based on issues arising from the 2001 tax year. Solomon, 95
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1390.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1395.
159. The court did not explicitly state that it was rejecting the Service’s determination and instead,
the court described what each side asked for and then went on to say what it found. Id. Therefore,
understanding the court’s holding can take several read-throughs.
Interestingly, Westlaw
misunderstood the holding of the court, saying that the court “held that taxpayers received interests in a
customer list as distribution from corporation.” Solomon, 2008 WL 174406. Lexis had no such
problem, saying that “The court held that the $500,000 and $140,000 that was allocated to the
shareholders’ sale of the customer list was actually attributable to their covenants not to compete.”
Solomon, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 107.
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Robert and Richard.160
The story starts with Robert and Richard Solomon, along with their
wives, six family members and an employee stock ownership plan owning
all of the stock of Solomon Colors, Inc.161 One line of business of their
company was the production of Mather ore,162 and only two companies
produced it: Solomon Colors and their competitor, Prince Manufacturing.
By 2000, the ingredients for Mather ore had been depleted, and the only
way to continue production of Mather ore was to use a different type of
ingredient that would require a different type of processing equipment.
Solomon Colors determined that it would cost about $1.5 million to replace
their processing equipment to continue to produce Mather ore. Since
Prince also produced Mather ore, Prince was in the same situation.
Prince then approached Solomon Colors about purchasing Solomon’s
Mather ore business.163 Solomon Colors liked the idea: it would not have
to spend the money on new equipment and new processes, and it could use
the money from the sale to expand its operations on the West Coast.164
From the start of negotiations until the closing, the purchase price
remained the same: $1,500,000.165 What changed during the month of
negotiations was the allocation of the $1.5 million purchase price. The
initial term sheet merely said it was for “the Mather ore division of SGS
Solomon Colors.”166 The next term sheet said it was for the mill that
processed the Mather ore, and a requirement that Solomon Colors stop
producing any Mather ore products.167 Solomon Colors prepared the first
draft of the purchase agreement, and it allocated the entire $1.5 million

160. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1394.
161. Brief for Petitioners at 9, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05); Opening Brief for
Respondent at 15, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05).
162. Mather ore, a red iron oxide ore, is used for such things as color in concrete. See Opening
Brief for Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05). Originally, Solomon
Colors was in the business of mining, but as the mines began to deplete, Solomon Colors changed its
focus to selling pigment colors in 1972. JANICE A. PETTERCHAK, HISTORIC ILLINOIS: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 124 (2005). Solomon Colors’ business is now solely concrete colors. SOLOMON COLORS,
INC., http://www.solomoncolors.com. They are the largest American-owned producer of iron oxide
pigments. PETTERCHAK, supra, at 124.
163. The record is silent about why Prince Manufacturing wanted to spend the money to upgrade its
equipment and stay in the Mather ore business, and why Solomon Colors would do the opposite.
However, it could be because the focus of each company was so different: Solomon Colors was only in
the concrete colors business, whereas Prince Manufacturing was more diversified, and serving many
different industries as a contract manufacturer in the metal and composites industry. Prince
Manufacturing, last accessed on Sept. 6, 2016, https://www.princemanufacturing.com.
164. Solomon Colors eventually expanded westward, with two facilities in Rialto, California.
165. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1391. The case is silent on why the anticipated cost of replacing
the Mather ore equipment ($1,500,000) is identical to the price paid for the sale of the business.
166. Id. The “SGS” comes from the prior name of Solomon Colors, which was “Solomon GrindChem Services, Inc.” Opening Brief for Respondent at 17, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 2029405).
167. Id. at 22.
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purchase price to the mill, even though the mill was only worth about
$100,000.168 After the initial drafts, Prince decided that it wanted the main
four Solomon shareholders to enter into a covenant not to compete as a
condition of sale.169
The parties then spent about a month negotiating the final terms of the
deal.170 After that, the deal was then run by inside and outside accountants
for Solomon Colors. It was only then that a discussion of allocating the
purchase price appears. Although Robert Solomon had talked internally
with Solomon attorneys about transferring a customer list as a part of the
sale,171 any amounts to be allocated to that customer list wasn’t discussed
in detail until the accountants became involved. The Solomon Colors
accountants suggested various allocations172 with the principals at Solomon
Colors, but it is not clear when this internal discussion began to overlap
with discussions with the principals from the Prince side.
In the end, the parties ended up having two agreements: the first was a
Purchase and Sale of Covenant Not to Compete Agreement (“PSCNC
Agreement”) that allocated the $1,400,000 purchase price173 between a
covenant not to compete and the customer list: $700,000 to Solomon
Colors ($150,000 for the entity-level covenant not to compete, and
$550,000 for the customer list), and $700,000 to the Solomon shareholders,
($60,000 for the covenant not to compete, and $640,000 for the customer
list). All of the Solomon Parties signed the PSCNC Agreement. The
second agreement was a Side Agreement, which had the sale of the mill, as
well as the provisions for transferring the Mather ore business from
Solomon Colors to Prince. The Side Agreement was only signed by Robert
Solomon in his capacity as president, but not individually. However, the

168. Id. The reason for this, according to Solomon Colors’ attorney, was that it was worried about
possible antitrust problem. The antitrust problem would be a perception that Prince and Solomon
Colors were forming a monopoly that would increase the prices of its products by virtue of being the
only producer in town. Id. at 21–22.
169. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1391.
170. Id. at 1391. These negotiations weren’t memorialized in drafts of the agreement, rather they
were gleaned from internal memos, email exchanges, fax covers to opposing counsel and oral testimony
at trial. See id. at 391–94 (detailing exchanges throughout memorandum). A major part of the
Solomon family’s argument was that it wanted more recognition for the oral testimony of the players in
the transaction. See Brief for Petitioners at 4, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) (No. 20294-05). It was no
surprise that the Service characterized all the testimony as self-serving. See Opening Brief for
Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05).
171. Opening Brief for Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05).
172. Among the possibilities was the allocation of $550,000 to each, the company and Robert
Solomon, for the customer lists (where $400,000 would remain to allocate). Conversely, $880,000
would be allocated to Solomon Colors, with the remaining $620,000 being allocated to the four main
shareholders.
173. Although the opinion is not clear, apparently Prince Manufacturing paid Solomon Colors
$100,000 at the closing for the Mather ore business, or for the machine. Therefore, the amount being
allocated was only $1,400,000. See id. at 12.
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PSCNC was incorporated by reference.174
The Solomon Parties reported the receipt of money from the
transaction as long term capital gain for the “Customer List/Goodwill,” and
ordinary income for the money attributed to the covenant not to compete
for their 2000 tax year.175 In 2005, the Service determined deficiencies for
the Solomon Parties, based on the Service’s position that, despite the plain
language in the PSCNC Agreement, Solomon Colors had received the
entire amount of the sale, and then distributed money for the customer list
to the individual Solomons.176
Litigation followed, with the court rejecting the positions of both the
Solomon Parties and the Service. The court found that the customer list
had absolutely no value at all, leaving only the covenant not to compete to
be purchased. However, the allocation for Solomon Colors between the
customer list and covenant not to compete was respected (Query how the
customer list has no value on the one hand, but it has value on the other,
when it is the same customer list). For Robert, Richard and their wives, the
court decided that since the customer list had no value, the entire $700,000
that the Solomons had received was for their covenants not to compete.
The court distinguished Solomon from Martin Ice Cream in several
ways: first, it found that the customer relationships between the individual
Solomons and their customers unimportant (Martin Ice Cream found that
the customer relationships between Arnold and the supermarkets was the
most valuable asset being purchased); second, the individual Solomons
weren’t named as sellers in any of the documents (Arnold was named as a
seller of the assets), and third, Prince Manufacturing didn’t require
employment or consulting agreements from the individual Solomons
(Arnold had signed a consulting agreement along with a non-compete
agreement with Haagen-Dazs).
What’s odd about this opinion is that the court cherry-picked facts and
law to come to the decision it did, and ignored facts and law that countered
its opinion. Some examples:
The court in Solomon gave great weight to the fact that the individual
Solomons hadn’t signed the Side Agreement in their individual capacities,
overlooking that the Side Agreement had incorporated by reference the
PSCNC Agreement, which did have the Solomons signing individually.
The court’s determination that the customer list had no value to Prince
Manufacturing was key in its finding that 100% of the proceeds that went

174. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1394.
175. See id. at 1394. If the allocation had been respected, the income reporting and its
characterization would be correct.
176. In other words, according to the Service, Solomon Colors should have reported the entire
$1,400,000 as income, and the $700,000 that the individual Solomons received would be a dividend
payment to them. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1).
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to the Solomon individuals was for their covenants not to compete.177
However, the court respected the $550,000 allocation to the customer list
for Solomon Colors.178 The court never explains how the customer list had
value to Prince when it came from the corporation, but it had no value
when it came from the shareholders.
Also, Solomon cited to Martin Ice Cream when it suited its purposes,
and ignored any similarity to Martin Ice Cream when it did not. For
example:
Like Martin Ice Cream¸ the relationships developed by Robert and
Richard179 pre-dated the formation of the corporation.180 The court in
Solomon found that Robert and Richard Solomon had developed personal
relationships181 just as Arnold had done in Martin Ice Cream, but Solomon
ignored this in its opinion.
Like Martin Ice Cream, when the corporation was formed, no
intangible assets were transferred to the corporation. Martin Ice Cream
used this to show that Arnold still owned the intangible assets; Solomon
used this to show that there were no intangible assets to transfer.182
Like Martin Ice Cream, neither Robert or Richard Solomon had an
employment agreement or a covenant not to compete agreement with their
corporation. Solomon ignores this similarity.
In Martin Ice Cream, even though Arnold signed as an individual
signatory, only one check was made out–to the corporation. In Solomon¸
although the individual Solomons didn’t sign one of the agreements in their
individual capacity, they did receive checks separate from the check to the
corporation.
What Solomon and Martin Ice Cream have in common is the theme
that runs through all of the goodwill cases: the amount of negotiations for
an allocation to goodwill early in the game, as well as the quality of those
negotiations. True, the Solomon Parties did discuss the allocations to
goodwill (i.e., the customer lists), but they did it only as part of a
discussion on how to make it tax advantaged.
As the Solomon case shows, it was not enough for the parties to talk
about allocation late in the process, and it was not enough to talk about
allocation of goodwill without talking about the value of the goodwill other
than as a tax strategy. This is what the subsequent cases show as well – the
courts are requiring a substantive discussion/negotiation over the value of
the goodwill in order to respect an allocation of part of the purchase price

177. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1395.
178. Id.
179. As well as by Robert Solomon Senior, who had actually started the company in 1927.
PETTERCHAK, supra note 161, at 24.
180. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1390.
181. Id.
182. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1395.
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towards it.
The court was likely influenced by the Solomon accountants’ internal
memos, which were all bad facts for the Solomon Parties. One accountant
referred to Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk, and then wrote that personal
goodwill didn’t fit with the Solomon transaction, saying “as a practical
matter, the “goodwill” that is created is arguably more at the entity level,
not so much at the individual shareholder-employee level.”183 The
accountant also talked about reducing Robert Solomon’s salary and
allocating some of the purchase price to account for it.184 However, the
accountant went on to say that the only thing that Prince was buying was
the customer relationship,185 which the court ignored. The accountant’s
memos only talk about what sort of allocation would pass muster with the
Service, and not about the various values of the assets being allocated.186 A
Solomon attorney wrote a memo that Solomon Colors was “doing some
creative tax planning by diverting some of the proceeds to the
shareholders.”187
2. Muskat v. United States188
This case is barely a blip on the screen of personal goodwill cases, but
it does reiterate the idea that negotiations specifically for personal goodwill
are key to the court making a finding of personal goodwill. In addition,
Muskat had a different procedural start than did the other personal goodwill
cases: this one did not start from an audit. Rather, it was a claim for refund
through the U.S. District Court.189 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court,190 and found that a payment for a covenant not to compete
was not really for personal goodwill. Most of the discussion on goodwill is
at the lower court; the court of appeals focused more on the standard of
proof to recharacterize income for tax purposes.
Irwin Muskat was the president and a 37% shareholder of Jac Pac
Foods, a business started by his grandfather and uncle.191 A subsidiary of
Corporate Brand Foods America, Inc. (“CBFA”) purchased all of the assets

183. Id. at 1392.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1391.
186. See id. at 1392.
187. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1392.
188. 554 F.3d 183 (2009).
189. Muskat v. United States, No. 06-cv-30-JD, 2008 WL 138052, at *1 (D. N.H. Jan. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Muskat 1]. At least one commentator queried whether Muskat might have prevailed if he
been audited rather than seeking a refund. David E. Kahen & Elliot Pisem, Sale of Closely Held
Business: Allocations of Consideration, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.newyorklawjour
nal.com/id=1202 428381075?keywords=Kahen+Pisem+Allocations.
190. Muskat, 554 F.3d at 187.
191. Id.
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of Jac Pack for $34 million, which included about $15 million for business
goodwill. In addition, and in a separate agreement, CBFA agreed to pay
Irwin personally about $5 million for a covenant not to compete, of which
$1 million was paid on closing. Irwin listed the $1 million payment as
ordinary income on his 1998 tax return. In 2002, Irwin filed a claim for a
refund of $203,434,192 claiming he mistakenly characterized the payment as
ordinary income, when it should have been characterized as a long term
capital gain because the payment was really for his personal good will.193
Irwin’s problem was that there was absolutely nothing in the record
that could be used to recharacterize the payment for the covenant not to
compete as a payment for personal goodwill. Personal goodwill was never
mentioned in the negotiations, it was never mentioned internally and it
appears as if no one thought of this characterization until the claim for
refund in 2002.194 Irwin tried to pull everything out of the agreements that
he could to try to make the argument that the payment was really for
personal goodwill, but he could not even come close. In addition to the
agreements being silent on personal goodwill, as well as the negotiations
being silent on personal goodwill, CBFA’s president testified at trial that
there was no other goodwill than the business goodwill that CBFA had
specifically purchased. Irwin didn’t stand a chance.
3. Kennedy v. Commissioner195
Kennedy is another off-the-radar case that falls in line with the
previous cases: that failure to negotiate up front for an allocation of part of
the purchase price to personal goodwill kills its chances of that allocation
being respected by the Service.
James Kennedy (“Kennedy”) was an employee benefits consultant
running his own business as a C corporation, KCG International, Inc. when
he began to consider selling his business in early 2000.196 In the summer of
2000, Ed Mack (“Mack”) of Mack and Parker, Inc. (“M&P”),197
192. Id. The payment broke down as $176,652 as ordinary income tax, and $26,782 as selfemployment tax. Id. n.2. Unfortunately for Irwin, he didn’t initially make a separate claim for a refund
of the self-employment tax, so the appellate court didn’t allow a refund. Id. at 195. It is likely that that
Irwin would have won the self-employment tax refund claim.
193. Complaint at 18, Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 08–1513).
194. One reason that no one thought of it or talked about it in 1998 may have been because Martin
Ice Cream was so new. Martin Ice Cream was decided in March 1998. 110 T.C. at 189. In contrast,
the Muskat asset sale occurred only 2 months later in May 1998. 554 F.3d at 187.
195. Kennedy v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268.
196. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 19, Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (No. 2180-08).
197. Mack & Parker Inc. was a subsidiary of Hub International Limited, an international insurance
brokerage. Press Release, Hub Int'l, Hub International Limited and Its Subsidiary Mack and Parker
Announce Acquisition of Kennedy Consulting Group (Apr. 21, 2001) (on file with author). Mach &
Parker changed its name to Hub International Illinois in October 2004. Press Release, Hub Int'l, Mack
and Parker, Inc. Changes Name to HUB International Illinois (Oct. 4, 2004) (on file with author).
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approached Kennedy about M&P purchasing Kennedy’s business,198 and
on October 31, 2000, the parties closed the deal.
At the start of the negotiations during the summer, Mack and Kennedy
discussed the purchase price for the business, without discussing what
M&P would actually be purchasing.199 As Kennedy would continue to
work for M&P after the purchase of his business, Mack and Kennedy
decided early on that the purchase price would be based on 150% of
Mack’s predicted annual income once at M&P, with only the payment
schedule left to determine.200 It wasn’t until September, after M&P sought
legal advice on the transaction, that the parties gave any thought to the
actual structure of the transaction. M&P’s attorney, Jerry Roberts,
contacted a tax accountant to look for ways to “enhance the tax benefits,”
and then Roberts wrote an email to Mack, listing the various structures that
M&P might use and their tax consequences.201 At the end, Roberts
suggested that M&P could “take the position that Kennedy owns [his
corporation’s] customer list and the good will with the customers and hence
could sell them directly to M&P.”202 Ultimately, it was this email, and the
fact that the ultimate structure included a sale of the customer list, that
caused the court to find that there was not any personal goodwill in this
transaction.203 As the court stated, the “goodwill was a tax motivated
afterthought that occurred late in the negotiations.”204
Many commentators since Kennedy have focused on the court’s
statement that “[w]e find it significant that there is a lack of economic
reality to the contractual allocation of the payments to goodwill.”205
However, the reason the court found a lack of economic reality in Kennedy
was that the parties did not negotiate for it. If the parties had ended up with
the exact same purchase price but also showed that they discussed the
allocation at the start of the negotiations, query whether the court would
have still found a lack of economic reality.
There was one oddity in this case: the court held that Kennedy would
be liable for self-employment taxes on the amounts he received from the
sale of assets. What made this unusual is that the court first stated that
because payments for a covenant not to compete are ordinary income just

198. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 20, Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (No. 2180–08).
199. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 269.
200. Id.
201. Id. The Kennedys were also assessed an accuracy related penalty. However, because the
Kennedys reasonably relied on Roberts, who consulted a tax attorney he relied on for advice, the court
concluded that the Kennedys were not liable for the penalty. Id. at 275.
202. Id. at 269.
203. See id. at 273.
204. Id. at 274.
205. See e.g., Robert F. Reilly, Kennedy v. Commissioner: Income Tax Consequences of Structuring
the Company Purchase/Sale Transaction, INSIGHTS 64 (2011). See also Charles J. Reichert, Sale of
Business Generates Ordinary Income, 211 J. ACCT. 57 (2011).

SHUGART.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

118

2/9/2017 3:53 PM

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13:1

as payment for services are ordinary income, the court did not need to
allocate the payments between services and noncompetition obligations.206
However, although both are ordinary income, only payment for services is
also subject to self-employment tax.207 The court apparently did not know
about this distinction, as it went on to say that simply because it had
decided that the payments were ordinary income, the payments were
necessarily includable in self-employment income.208
F. HOWARD V. UNITED STATES209
Unlike the cases after Martin Ice Cream cited above, Howard v.
United States210 was the first case since Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk that
got a lot of attention,211 perhaps because it was the first case after 1998 that
dealt with a professional corporation, but also perhaps because it was read
as the opposite result of Norwalk,212 as both cases dealt with professional
practices, but came up with different results.
Larry Howard was a dentist who wanted to start the transition to
retirement at the relatively young age of 55.213 He had been practicing as a
dentist since 1972, and operating his dental practice as a C corporation
since 1980.214 Dr. Howard ran the corporation as one should: he ran
everything through it, e.g., the payroll, malpractice insurance,
reimbursement of his expenses. In addition, in what would turn out to be
the deciding factor in his case, and for no apparent reason,215 Dr. Howard
entered into an employment agreement as well as a covenant not to
compete agreement with his new corporation. In the detailed 10 page
agreement,216 among other things, Dr. Howard agreed to not compete with
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 274.
I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(E).
Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 275.
Howard v. Commissioner, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010), aff’d, 448 Fed. Appx. 752 (2011).
Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533.
See Mark L. Silow, Goodwill and Professional Service Corporations, 244 LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER 5 (2011).
212. Scott E. Vincent, Ninth Circuit Rejects Personal Goodwill Allocation in Sale of Professional
Practice, 67 J. MO. BAR 309 (2011).
213. Howard was born in 1946. Provider Credential Search for Larry Eugene Howard, WASH.
STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, last accessed Sept. 2, 2016, https://fortress.wa.gov/doh/providercred
entialsearch/SearchCriteria.aspx.
214. The corporation was formed as a Professional Service Corporation under the Revised Code of
Washington, Title 18, 18.100.010 et seq., on October 1, 1980. LEXISNEXIS, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE
CORP. FILING RECORDS (on file with author).
215. There is no business or tax reason for the sole shareholder of a corporation to enter into an
employment agreement with that corporation. Others have noted this as well. See, e.g., Silow, supra
note 210, at 5.
216. Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Section A,
January 15, 2010, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010)
(No. 08–365).
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his corporation, including for an additional 3 year period after no longer
owning stock in the company.217
In 2002, Dr. Howard put his business up for sale with a business
broker, and attracted a young dentist from South Dakota, Bryan Finn.218
When Dr. Finn decided to purchase the practice, he had not discussed
anything about the structure of the purchase; rather, he had only been
presented with a total price, which he accepted.219 Apparently, someone
other than Dr. Finn or Dr. Howard decided how to allocate the purchase
price, and then presented a summary of what the allocation meant to both
dentists.220 The final purchase price was $613,000, with $549,900
allocated to Dr. Howard’s personal goodwill,221 $16,000 allocated to Dr.
Howard for a covenant not to compete with Dr. Finn’s practice,222 and
$47,100 allocated to Dr. Howard’s corporation for equipment and
miscellaneous assets.223 Dr. Howard and his wife, Joan, filed their 2002
federal tax return, reporting $320,358 as long term capital gain.224
For three years following the purchase by Dr. Finn, Dr. Howard
continued to work as a dentist, but only part time,225 and was paid through
his corporation (not Dr. Finn’s). Dr. Howard’s corporation paid him
$110,000 per year, and he continued to receive benefits from his
corporation.226 The Service subsequently audited the Howards’ tax return,
recharacterized the sale of the goodwill as a corporate asset, treated the
amount received by the Howards as a dividend from Dr. Howard’s
corporation and then charged the Howards with a deficiency.227 The
217. Id.
218. DR. BRYAN FINN, SPOKANE DENTIST, WASH., http://www.newexpressionsdental.com/about_
us/Dr_Bryan_K_Finn.htm.
219. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 9.
220. See Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Section A,
January 15, 2010, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010)
(No. 08–365). Dr. Howard’s attorney used the passive voice in explaining the summary (“A ‘summary’
of the proposed Asset Purchase Agreement was provided to the parties”). What’s interesting is that the
summary was provided to both parties, indicating that a broker handled the transaction for both parties,
without either having an attorney.
221. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 3.
222. Id.
223. United States’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at
Background, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) (No.
08–365).
224. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 4.
225. Id. One of Dr. Howard’s hobbies was restoring old aircraft, at which he apparently spent much
of his free time. Following the sale of his dental practice, he flew in the 2003 National Air Tour, an
organization that recreates the 1925-1931 National Air Tours. See Planes, Pilots & People of the 2003
tour!, NATIONAL AIR TOUR, http://www.nationalairtour.org/pilotplanespeople/.
226. Although the record is silent on the financial structure of the practice after the sale to Dr. Finn,
it is likely that Dr. Howard kept his name on the business in order to assist Dr. Finn in passing the
business over to Dr. Finn, and that there was some sort of calculation for how much money coming into
the practice went directly to Dr. Howard’s corporation.
227. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 4.
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Howards paid the deficiency, and then made a claim for refund.228
In recharacterizing the goodwill as a corporate asset, the Service
focused primarily on Dr. Howard’s employment and covenant not to
compete agreement between him and his corporation.229 The Service went
through a litany of rights that Dr. Howard’s corporation had because of
those agreements, and determined that since the corporation owned all of
the assets and rights of the corporation, it necessarily owned all of the
goodwill as well.230 Interestingly, when the Service made the argument
that “courts look for employment agreements and covenants not to
compete, which by their very existence, make the relationships developed
by the employee the property of the corporation,”231 it cited no cases for
that proposition. Later in its argument, the Service cited statements in
Martin Ice Cream and MacDonald v. Commissioner232 that the absence of
employment agreements means that the personal goodwill (or a taxpayer’s
ability, in MacDonald) is not owned by the contracting corporation.
However, Martin Ice Cream and MacDonald never said that – rather, they
only used the lack of employment agreements as evidence that the personal
goodwill did not belong to the corporation.
On the other side, the first argument made by Dr. Howard was to
analogize to dissolution of marriage cases, in which the value of the
personal goodwill of a spouse in a professional practice is divided between
the spouses.233 The court never addressed this argument other than to say
that the Howards made it, perhaps because valuing the goodwill of a
community property interest was irrelevant to a discussion of personal
goodwill belonging to a corporation or an individual.234,235 The Howard
case was dealing with federal income tax law, and its attorney was arguing
state community property law.
The second argument made by Dr. Howard was that the asset purchase
agreement clearly allocated the purchase price. The court promptly
dismissed this argument, based on the substance over form concept of the
personal goodwill cases, because the agreement did not reflect the

228. Id. The case was actually a decision of two competing summary judgment motions, as the
Howards and the Service agreed on all the material facts.
229. Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, January 15, 2010,
Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) (No. 08–365).
230. Id.
231. Id. at Argument.
232. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720, 727 (1944).
233. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 8.
234. The Howards’ attorney was Gary Randall, of Workland & Witherspoon, he was primarily a tax
and community property attorney, and taught classes on these subjects at Gonzaga University for over
30 years. Gary Randall, WORKLAND & WITHERSPOON, http://workwith.com/gary-c-randall/.
235. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 9. In fact, the court gave such short shrift to the dissolution
analogy that when it came to discussing the Howards’ third argument, the court labeled it as the
Howards’ second argument.
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relationship between Dr. Howard and Dr. Finn.236 The court was
influenced not just by the lack of negotiations for the allocation, but the
fact that the allocation had not even been mentioned at all.237
Dr. Howard’s third argument, which might be characterized as
clutching at straws, was that when Dr. Howard sold his business, that
action necessarily terminated the employment and covenant not to compete
agreement. Dr. Howard’s theory was that since he could have modified the
agreement at any time, the sale of the company did just that.238
The Court went with the Service. In addition to ignoring the
dissolution case law presented by the Howards and dismissing out of hand
the idea that what the contract explicitly says should control the allocation,
the court went with the existence of the employment and covenant not to
compete agreement to mean that the goodwill was a corporate asset. It
added that even if the sale of assets to Dr. Finn terminated the employment
and covenant not to compete agreement, the goodwill accumulated during
the existence of the agreement stayed with the corporation.
Howard, then, added to the personal goodwill list of things not to do
in order to have an allocation of personal goodwill respected.239
G. H & M, INC. V. COMMISSIONER240
As a post script to Howard, H & M tangentially tackled personal
goodwill, and reiterated the basic ideas of Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk:
that when the business of a corporation depends on the personal
relationships of a key individual, there is no corporate goodwill to be sold
(Martin Ice Cream) absent a transfer of that goodwill to the corporation
(Norwalk).241 And, what made this case interesting was that personal
goodwill was not even brought into the case until H & M’s post trial
brief.242
Howard Schmeets was the King of Insurance in Harvey, North
Dakota.243 He had been a successful insurance agent in Harvey since the
late 1960s, and by 1980, he was the sole shareholder of Harvey Insurance
Agency, Inc., a North Dakota corporation.244 However, despite Mr.

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 9–10.
239. See, e.g., Charles J. Reichert, Whose Goodwill Is it?, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, Oct. 31
2010, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/nov/goodwill.html.
240. H & M, Inc. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452.
241. Id. at 457–58.
242. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 41-42, H&M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09).
243. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 452.
244. Id. After the sale of the corporation, Mr. Schmeets changed the name to H&M, Inc. Id. at 455.
They apparently had no problem with using the same name of the retail clothing store: in Mr. Schmeet’s
case, the “H” and “M” stand for Harvey and Mona Schmeets.
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Schmeets’ local success, he was still a relatively small Midwestern rural
player in the national insurance game. When large, national insurance
companies began to demand more volume from insurance agencies in the
1990s, Mr. Schmeets could not keep up.
Luckily, another competitor in town with whom Mr. Schmeets had a
history was experiencing the same problem, so the two started talking
about combining.245 Negotiations ensued, and Mr. Schmeets decided to
sell his company to the competitor, an agency within the National Bank of
Harvey (the “Bank”). Mr. Schmeets’ biggest concern was to be able to
have continued employment, so the deal was structured to pay him $20,000
for the assets, along with a six year employment contract with a noncompete and some deferred comp thrown in.246 At the end of the day when
the agreement was signed in 1992, the package was worth about
$600,000.247
Everything went off as planned: Mr. Schmeets worked for the new
agency for six years, and he got all of the money he was entitled to. At the
end of the six years, Mr. Schmeets retired.
After an audit, the Service sent a deficiency notice to H&M claiming,
among other things, that the salary and deferred compensation Mr.
Schmeets received were actually payments to the corporation for the
insurance business.248 The Service therefore assessed the corporation for
capital gain and interest income for the now-recharacterized salary and
deferred compensation payments.249 H&M paid the deficiency, and then
petitioned for a re-determination of the deficiency.
During the trial, the Service made what H&M called a “reverse
valuation”250–after not contesting that the assets had a value of $20,000, the
Service claimed that the excess must be attributed to the corporation’s
goodwill,251 claiming that substance over form requires this allocation.252
H&M rebutted that in its post-trial brief, noting that if it was goodwill
at all, it was personal goodwill. Interestingly, it used the argument that
other cases have used against personal goodwill: that since there was no
valuation of the corporation, no discussion of tax consequences or benefits,
and no discussion at all of the allocation of the purchase price, the Service
cannot now claim that there was goodwill attributable to the corporation.253
245. Id. at 454.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 456. Presumably the statute of limitations hadn’t passed, as the
parties had renegotiated the contract in 1993, and Mr. Schmeets deferred his compensation even further
into the 2000s. In fact, the audit was for the years 2001 through 2005.
249. Id.
250. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 40, H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09).
251. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 456.
252. Id.
253. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 40-42, H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09).
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In addition, H&M argued that the testimony at trial also showed that the
insurance business was personal to Mr. Schmeets: that it was Mr. Schmeets
who was well known and not his agency, that business came to Mr.
Schmeets, and not the corporation itself, that the sale would not have
happened if Mr. Schmeets had not agreed to be employed by the Bank after
the sale. The idea, H&M said, was that the Bank would not have just
purchased the Harvey Insurance Agency, it wanted Mr. Schmeets.254 H&M
also tackled the substance over form argument, by pointing out that the
substance of the transaction did match the form: that both parties treated
the deal as an employment relationship, and that there were no facts to back
up any other allocation.255
The court fully bought H&M’s argument that the compensation was
not goodwill belonging to the corporation.256 However, it limited its
holding only to finding that the payments to Mr. Schmeets were not
disguised purchase-price payments to H&M.257 Although the court
believed that part of the compensation should have been allocated to Mr.
Schmeets for personal goodwill, it made no finding as Mr. Schmeets’ tax
liability was not before the court.258
This case will likely be cited in the future for personal goodwill cases,
as it has a good exposition of the personal goodwill doctrine, starting with a
longer-than-typical explanation of MacDonald v. Commissioner259 and
Newark Morning Ledger260 and a review of holdings that found personal
goodwill.
F. BROSS TRUCKING, INC. V. COMMISSIONER261
The recent case of Bross Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner revived the
conversation about who owns the goodwill in the distribution of assets
from a corporation. Bross Trucking went into great detail about the
attributes of personal goodwill v. corporate goodwill262 and found that the
corporation had no goodwill to distribute.263 Bross Trucking defined
personal goodwill in an overbroad manner out of sync with previous cases,

254. Id.
255. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 457.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 458.
258. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 458. It actually would have been better for Mr. Schmeets if he
had allocated part of the compensation to personal goodwill, as the personal goodwill would have had
capital gains treatment, and his compensation not only was ordinary income, but subject to employment
taxes as well.
259. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720 (1944).
260. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
261. Bross Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1528.
262. Id. at 1532–35.
263. Id. at 1535.
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stating that it is when “all of the goodwill is attributable solely to the
personal ability of the [individual].”264 Nevertheless, this case is all the
rage for commentators to find this is a continuation of Howard and Martin
Ice Cream.265
Bross Trucking involved a bunch of companies owned by one guy–
Chester Bross. Bross Trucking was one of those companies–and the
trucking company’s main customers/suppliers were all family members of
Chester Bross. After Bross Trucking got into some trouble with the
Department of Transportation after some audit and financial problems,
Chester decided to shut down Bross Trucking, and have his three sons start
a new trucking company, LWK Trucking.266 Although LWK expanded
into areas that Bross Trucking hadn’t entered, it still continued the exact
same business done by Bross Trucking, which involved using the same
customers as Bross Trucking (which customers were all family owned).267
The Service claimed that what had happened, in effect, was that Bross
Trucking had distributed all of its intangible assets in Bross Trucking to
Chester (a taxable event), and then Chester transferred those intangible
assets to LWK (a gift tax event), both of which were not included in Bross
Trucking or Chester’s tax returns for 2004, the year in which LWK was
formed.
Basing its reasoning on its analysis of Martin Ice Cream and Solomon,
the court determined that Bross Trucking’s goodwill was “primarily owned
by Mr. Bross personally, and the company could not transfer any corporate
goodwill to Mr. Bross.”268
The court in Bross made several interesting, but questionable points:
1. The court seemed to have two definitions of goodwill–the first was
for corporate goodwill, as “the expectation of continued patronage,”269
which the court seemed to limit to the value (or negative value) of the
“Bross” name.270 However, the definition in the regulations includes “any
other factor”271 that would contribute to an expectation of continued
patronage, a much broader standard. The second type of goodwill only
applied to personal goodwill, and that was defined as personal relationships

264. Id. at 1533.
265. See, e.g., Risius, & Stumpf, Aaron, supra note 10.
266. Chester did consider having his three sons use Bross Trucking. Opening Brief for Respondent
at 30, Bross, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1528 (No. 7710-11). However, on advice of counsel, Chester and his
sons decided to form a new company. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1530.
267. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1530.
268. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1532.
269. Although goodwill is defined in section 1.197-2(b)(1) of the regulations, the court only used
definitions from cases, such as Network Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555
(1993). See Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1532.
270. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1533.
271. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1).
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between a shareholder and customers/vendors.272 The court then expanded
personal goodwill to mean anything that was due to the personal ability of a
shareholder.273 There are not two types of goodwill: there is only one, and
the only question is who the goodwill belongs to.
2. The court made specious arguments about the relationship between
Bross Trucking and LWK. It noted that customers did not trust Bross
Trucking and would not want to continue doing business with it,274 that
LWK would want to hide the Bross logo from customers,275 that customers
of Bross Trucking only did business with it due to having personal
relationships with customers276 and “Bross Trucking’s customers had a
choice of trucking options and chose to switch from Bross Trucking to
LWK Trucking,”277 all the while pretending that the customers and Bross
Trucking were not all in the same family.
3. The court had a very narrow version of the definition of a covenant
not to compete, saying that it had to be a signed noncompete agreement.278
However, the regulations are somewhat broader, saying that it can also be
an arrangement that “has substantially the same effect as a covenant not to
compete.”279 Since the arrangement was clearly that LWK would take over
doing the work that Bross Trucking had been doing, and since the family
owned all of these companies, the effect was the same as if Bross Trucking
or Chester had signed a covenant not to compete.
4. Even if LWK did not receive any goodwill from Bross Trucking, it
certainly received it from Chester. The result would be that Chester would
not pay taxes on a distribution from Bross Trucking, but he certainly should
have accounted for the gift of the personal goodwill to his sons, which the
court did not discuss.
Although this case does not really add anything to the personal
goodwill discussion and, in fact, it may only muddy the waters, it has had
the effect of lawyers and accountants discussing personal goodwill more
frequently than we have seen in recent years.

272. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1533.
273. See id. (“A company does not have any corporate goodwill when all of the goodwill is
attributable solely to the personal ability of an employee.”).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1535.
278. Id. at 1534.
279. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(E).
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V. WHAT IS A SELLER TO DO? ADDING A LEGISLATIVE FIX
A comprehensive look at the details in the personal goodwill cases
show that adherence to one definitive list that decides whether goodwill is
personal or belongs to the company does not work, and attorneys and
accountants who rely on it are not standing on solid ground. Some cases
emphasize non-compete agreements with the buyer (= personal goodwill),
or employment agreements with the seller (≠ personal goodwill), others
emphasize personal relationships pre-dating the start of the company. But
one thread that does run through all of these cases: when in the process did
the buyer and seller first talk about personal goodwill? If the parties talk
about it only after negotiations on price have concluded, including only
mentioning it once litigation has started, courts will not call it personal
goodwill. If the parties never talk about it but have talked about things that
include facts that support a goodwill designation (e.g., signing the
agreement individually or purchase price in drafts shows an allocation for
an individual), a goodwill designation sometimes holds.280 A second factor
that runs through the cases is how the individual judge deciding the case
feels about the litigants, their arguments, or personal goodwill. Query
whether the idea of personal goodwill would ever have taken a foothold if
the judge in Martin Ice Cream had not been really interested in that topic to
begin with.281
A seller’s use of personal goodwill should not be dependent on their
knowing about it before they start to negotiate a deal, or whether they were
lucky enough to not have introduced it into the conversation after the fact.
Sellers should have some assurance that a contractually agreed-on
allocation, supported by statutorily defined back-up data, will be respected
by the Service, and not be subject to second guessing or to looking behind
the contract. In the cases since Martin Ice Cream, the futures of the
taxpayers rose and fell on the timing that they asked about using personal
goodwill as an allocation of part of their purchase price, their foolhardy
choice to consider tax savings as a reason for considering the use of
personal goodwill and how they chose to memorialize their work in their
business before even thinking about selling. The outcomes have sometimes
matched the reality of the business, but other times, not so much.
Just as section 197 was enacted to, among other reasons, bring
certainty to taxpayers in the amortization of their intangible assets, so too
can legislation bring certainty to taxpayers (and the Service) in the
allocation of goodwill in a sale of assets. Simple legislation could be
crafted to allow this allocation, with the taxpayer instructed to provide the

280. Martin Ice Cream is the best example of this: it had more factors weighing in the direction of
personal goodwill, without Arnold Strassberg ever having thought about it.
281. Martin Ice Cream v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 202 (T.C. 1998).
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backup that a synthesis of the factors in the personal goodwill cases now
require. These factors are
1. Appraisal of the personal goodwill (with certifications similar to
those required by appraisals for gift and estate taxes, using the language
from section 170).
2. A covenant not to compete and/or consultant agreement between
the buyer and the individual shareholder of the seller (to make the transfer
of the personal goodwill effective).
3. Attestation that the shareholder has not transferred any intangible
assets that would give rise to the corporation owning the goodwill (e.g., no
employment agreement or covenant not to compete with the shareholder’s
own corporation).
4. Agreement for sale of assets to be signed by both the corporation
and the individual, with the allocation spelled out in the contract.
The appraisal by a certified appraiser would take care of any trumped
up personal goodwill claims. This safe harbor for a personal goodwill
allocation would also allow sellers the opportunity to negotiate for
allocating part of the purchase price to personal goodwill without worrying
that their record will show that negotiations didn’t start early enough.
Having a specific statute for an allocation of personal goodwill will also
serve to allow all sellers the opportunity to use this allocation if it fits their
circumstances, rather than limiting it to the sellers with sophisticated
lawyers or accountants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Martin Ice Cream and the cases that followed has meant that it is a
crap shoot for a seller of assets allocating part of the purchase price to an
individual’s personal goodwill rather than to the corporation. Tax
consequences should not depend on the whims of any particular judge, or at
what point in the negotiations the parties discussed allocation of goodwill.
Contracts with tax allocations supported by appropriate backup entered into
between two willing participants shouldn’t be so easily discarded. As the
allocation of part of a purchase price of assets to the personal goodwill of a
shareholder is allowed under current law, its usage should be standard and
predictable, which it currently is not. Although commentators have
developed a list of criteria for the availability of an allocation to personal
goodwill, case law shows that the availability is more arbitrary than
commentators say. A legislative fix to establish standards for its usage
would allow predictability and reduce uncertainty for taxpayers, as well as
reduce the costs of litigation for this unsettled area of law.

